Last Thursday, Inspector General Michael Horowitz from the Department of Justice released a much-anticipated report that looks into how the FBI handled its confidential informants, known as confidential human sources (CHS), in relation to the events of January 6, 2021. The date we’re talking about is when a lot of people came together in Washington, D.C., to protest and ultimately break into the U.S. The Capitol building. This report has generated a lot of attention as it reveals some major shortcomings in the FBI’s methods of collecting and sharing intelligence prior to the event, along with how the Bureau managed its response during the crisis.It’s quite striking to note that there were 26 FBI informants present at or near the Capitol during the events of January 6, a number that exceeds what the FBI had originally reported. The FBI had officially designated only three confidential informants to monitor the happenings of that day. Finding out that there were many more sources involved has brought up new questions about what the FBI was aware of beforehand, why they didn’t appear to be better equipped, and if important intelligence was overlooked.This article will explore the key elements of Horowitz’s findings, detail the FBI’s response, and reflect on what these revelations could signify for the future of law enforcement and intelligence gathering in the United States.Key Discoveries: 26 FBI Sources Were at the CapitolThe Inspector General’s investigation began with a straightforward aim: to understand how the FBI utilized its confidential informants in the lead-up to January 6 and to determine if the agency had sufficient information to act decisively before the situation escalated. One of the most surprising findings was that there were 26 confidential sources present around the Capitol during the breach—some of them even managed to get inside the building.
Absence of a Cohesive StrategyNonetheless, the report shows that this intelligence wasn’t communicated to the FBI’s Washington Field Office (WFO) or other key law enforcement partners promptly. The Inspector General found that the FBI did not carry out a formal “canvass” of its numerous field offices prior to January 6. A canvass, in more straightforward language, would involve a wide-ranging effort to connect with every local office and collect any information they might have regarding potential threats related to the events in Washington. Deputy Director Paul Abbate, mentioned in the report, referred to the absence of a complete canvass as a “basic step that was missed.” He suggested that such a fundamental aspect should not have been neglected, particularly on a day as intense and politically important as January 6.Horowitz pointed out a significant contrast in the FBI’s preparations for the inauguration on January 20, 2021, compared to the Electoral College certification on January 6. As President Joe Biden’s inauguration approached, the FBI gathered comprehensive intelligence reports to get ready for any possible disturbances. However, the same intelligence-gathering measures either weren’t implemented or weren’t fully executed for January 6. Because of this, important pieces of information remained isolated at the local level and never reached the individuals who needed to be informed.
The FBI’s Official Response: A Complex OverviewIn the days and weeks following January 6, FBI leaders appeared before Congress and the public to assert that the agency had taken every possible measure to prepare for any potential violence on that day. They talked about “extraordinary measures” and emphasized the importance of keeping local field offices vigilant. However, the Inspector General’s report presents a more detailed view, indicating that the FBI’s actions were largely reactive rather than proactive. To put it another way, the Bureau increased its responses only after the situation at the Capitol began to deteriorate, instead of taking proactive measures to prevent the chaos through effective intelligence-sharing and teamwork.
